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PORNOSHOPPED: WHY CALIFORNIA SHOULD
ADOPT THE FEDERAL STANDARD
FOR CHILD PORNOGRAPHY
Brian Yamada*
In 2011, Joseph Gerber was convicted for possession of child pornography under California Penal Code section 311.11 when he photo-edited his
13-year-old daughter’s face onto the bodies of adult women. However, the
6th District of the California Court of Appeal reversed his conviction because the language of the statute required the child to “personally” engage in
the depicted conduct. As a result, in California it is very difficult to successfully prosecute morphed child pornography (where a picture of a real child
is manipulated into an unidentifiable minor). In addition, the ability of section 311.11 to protect children is substantially diminished in comparison to
the federal Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to end the Exploitation
of Children Today Act (PROTECT Act). Therefore, this Comment proposes that California should adopt its own version of the PROTECT Act (“CalPro”). It should have narrow language and a flexible sentencing scheme
that recognizes the state’s overcrowding epidemic. With these modifications, Cal-Pro strikes a balance between the goal of the Realignment Plan to
reduce prison overcrowding and maximizing the protection of our children.
I. INTRODUCTION
In the digital age, computer programs such as Adobe Photoshop are
used to create works of art.1 Some people use the program for more selfish
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purposes such as fixing unwanted defects in personal photographs or digitally inserting themselves into a picture with someone they admire.2 Recently,
Joseph Gerber used such technology for a more deviant purpose—editing
pornographic photos of adult women to include the face of his 13-year-old
daughter.3 Initially, Gerber was convicted of possession of child pornography, but his conviction was overturned on appeal.4 The California Court of
Appeal for the Sixth District concluded that the photographs were more similar to virtual child pornography and held that the mere possession of virtual
pornography was protected by the First Amendment.5
In Gerber, it was clear that no real child was used in the depicted sex
acts,6 but what happens when the subject cannot be conclusively classified as
real or virtual? Morphed child pornography is a type of virtual pornography
where the creator takes a photograph of a real child and manipulates the image into an unidentifiable minor.7 Morphed pornography creates a problem
for prosecutors because the prosecution must prove that an image is a real
child by identifying the specific child or the origin of the image.8 To meet
this high burden of proof, expert witnesses are required.9 However, even experts struggle to distinguish real images from virtual images as a result of sophisticated image-altering techniques.10 For example, one technique disguises pictures of real children by making them appear computer-generated.11
1. See 50 Images for Fans of Photoshop Art, PHOTOGRAPHY SCHS. ONLINE (Apr. 8,
2010, 5:40 PM), http://www.photographyschoolsonline.net/blog/2010/50-images-for-fans-ofphotoshop-art/.
2. See Tara Parker-Pope, Losing Weight by Photoshop, N.Y. TIMES WELL (Dec. 17, 2009,
11:36 AM), http://well.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/12/17/losing-weight-by-photoshop/; see also Filonia LeChat, How to Photoshop Yourself With a Celebrity, EHOW.COM (last updated June 27,
2011), http://www.ehow.com/how_8655378_photoshop-yourself-celebrity.html.
3. See Court: Calif. Dad Can Paste Daughter’s Face On Porn Pics, CBS L.A. (June 10,
2011),
http://losangeles.cbslocal.com/2011/06/10/court-calif-dad-can-paste-daughters-face-onporn-pics/.
4. See People v. Gerber, 196 Cal. App. 4th 368, 392 (2011), review denied, 2011 Cal.
LEXIS 8915 (Aug. 17, 2011).
5. See id. at 386.
6. See id. at 392.
7. See Shepard Liu, Note, Ashcroft, Virtual Child Pornography and First Amendment Jurisprudence, 11 U.C. DAVIS J. JUV. L. & POL’Y 1, 3 (2007).
8. See James Nicholas Kornegay, Note, Protecting Our Children and the Constitution:
An Analysis of the “Virtual” Child Pornography Provisions of the PROTECT Act of 2003, 47
WM. & MARY L. REV. 2129, 2148 (2006).
9. Id.
10. See Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to end the Exploitation of Children Today Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108–21, § 501, 117 Stat. 650, 677 (2003), available at http://www.
gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-108publ21/pdf/PLAW-108publ21.pdf (last visited Apr. 17, 2012).
11. See id. at 676.
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The expert’s job is further complicated because repeated transmissions of the
image from one possessor to another may alter it.12 In terms of time, money,
and expertise, it has become uneconomical to prosecute morphed child pornography, and as a result, only the most clear-cut cases are pursued.13
This note proposes that California expand its ability to protect minors
by passing a stricter child pornography law that will overcome the obstacles facing the prosecution of morphed child pornography. Part II of this
paper traces the criminalization of child pornography through statutes and
case law. Part III argues that the current California laws addressing child
pornography do not adequately protect children as demonstrated through
the recently decided case People v. Gerber.14 Finally, Part IV urges California to adopt a modified version of the Federal Prosecutorial Remedies
and Other Tools to end the Exploitation of Children Today Act (PROTECT
Act) to account for issues unique to California.
II. FEDERAL REGULATION OF CHILD PORNOGRAPHY
A. Protecting Children Is an Objective of “Surpassing Importance”15
Initially, the theory of obscenity was used to combat all kinds of pornography.16 In Miller v. California, the United States Supreme Court held
that work which was legally obscene was not protected by the First
Amendment.17 Miller defined obscenity as having three elements: (1) the
work as a whole must appeal to the prurient interest when the average person applies contemporary community standards;18 (2) it depicts or describes patently offensive sexual conduct, which is defined by state law;19
and (3) the work as a whole lacks “serious literary, artistic, political, or sci-

12. See Kornegay, supra note 8.
13. See Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to end the Exploitation of Children Today Act § 501.
14. See Gerber, 196 Cal. App. 4th at 392.
15. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 757 (1982).
16. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 29 (1973) (“[A] majority of this Court has agreed on concrete guidelines to isolate ‘hard core’ pornography from expression protected by the
First Amendment.”).
17. Id. at 36.
18. Id. at 24.
19. Id.
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entific value.”20 Unfortunately, under Miller, the only types of child pornography that could be prohibited were those that were legally obscene.21
As a result, the United States Supreme Court expanded its prohibition
of child pornography to non-obscene material in New York v. Ferber.22 In
Ferber, the Supreme Court upheld a New York statute penalizing the knowing promotion of sexual performances by minors for five reasons: (1) there
was a compelling governmental interest in protecting children; (2) child
pornography was intrinsically related to the abuse of children; (3) there was
an economic motive to distribute it; (4) child pornography had de minimis
societal value; and (5) case precedent was consistent with the holding.23
However, the Court noted an important limitation—if a description or depiction of sexual conduct was not obscene, or if it did not involve “live performances,” then First Amendment protection was retained.24
Later, in Osborne v. Ohio, the United States Supreme Court emphasized the “gravity of the state’s interests”25 when it held that an Ohio statute
could “constitutionally proscribe the possession and viewing of child pornography.”26 The statute prohibited possession of materials of a naked minor where the nudity was “a lewd exhibition or involve[d] a graphic focus
on the genitals, and where the person depicted was neither the child nor the
ward of the person charged.”27 Such regulation complied with the Ferber
limitation because it narrowly defined the banned conduct and did not punish possession of innocuous photographs of nude children—like a father
taking a picture of his child bathing.28 The decisions in Osborne and Ferber established the importance of preventing child abuse in pornography
and allowed for the prosecution of mere possession of child pornography.29
B. Federal Criminalization of Child Pornography Possession:
20. Id.
21. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 761 (stating the Court “cannot conclude that the Miller standard is
a satisfactory solution to the child pornography problem” because obscenity does not reflect the
compelling interest in prosecuting promoters of child pornography).
22. See Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 234 (2002) (“[P]ornography depicting actual children can be proscribed whether or not the images are obscene . . . .” (citing Ferber,
458 U.S. at 758)).
23. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 756–63.
24. Id. at 764–65.
25. Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 111 (1990).
26. Id.
27. Id. at 113.
28. See id. at 113–14.
29. See State v. Zidel, 940 A.2d 255, 258 (N.H. 2008) (“[Ferber] and [Osborne] together
hold that a state may proscribe the distribution and mere possession of child pornography.”).
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The CPPA and the PROTECT Act
In response to the holdings in Osborne and Ferber, Congress passed
the Child Pornography Protection Act of 1996 (“CPPA”).30 This statute
sought to prohibit child pornography but was held to be constitutionally
overbroad in Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition.31 The Court stated that the
statute banned a substantial amount of materials that were neither obscene
nor “‘intrinsically related’ to the sexual abuse of children.”32 For example,
under the CPPA, a movie about Romeo and Juliet or the Academy Awardwinning film American Beauty could be proscribed.33 The statute was
over-inclusive because it prohibited virtual child pornography where no
children were used in production, and it banned some works that were not
obscene.34 For example, an educational video about safe sex with cartoon
depictions of minors engaging in sexual conduct would be illegal even
though it teaches safe sex and there is no direct harm to children.35 Specifically, the Court disapproved of the “appears to be” and “conveys the impression” language, which resulted in the overbreadth problems.36
As a result, in 2003 Congress created the “Prosecutorial Remedies
and Other Tools to end the Exploitation of Children Today” Act
(“PROTECT Act”).37 The PROTECT Act amended the CPPA sections regarding the definition of child pornography and the pandering of it, and
created a new obscenity statute.38

30. Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2256 and 2252A (2000)
(repealed 2003) (current version is the Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to end the Exploitation of Children Today Act of 2003,18 U.S.C. §§ 2256, 2252A, and 1466A (2006)).
31. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. at 258 (“[T]he prohibitions of §§ 2256(8)(B) and
2256(8)(D) are overbroad and unconstitutional.”).
32. See id. at 249.
33. Id. at 247–48.
34. See id. at 234.
35. See generally id. at 248 (explaining that under the CPPA if a film contains a single
graphic depiction of sexual activity in the statutory definition, then it is illegal without looking
into its redeeming value—like teaching safe sex).
36. See id. at 258 (“[T]he prohibitions of §§ 2256(8)(B) and 2256(8)(D) are overbroad
and unconstitutional.”).
37. See Chelsea McLean, Note, The Uncertain Fate of Virtual Child Pornography Legislation, 17 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 221, 236 (2007) (“Congress scrambled to enact legislation
that would pass constitutional muster . . . .”).
38. See id.
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1. The Definition of Child Pornography
The CCPA prohibited child pornography in the form of “any visual
depiction, including any photograph, film, video, picture, or computer or
computer-generated image or picture, whether made or produced by electronic, mechanical, or other means, of sexually explicit conduct . . . .”39
The PROTECT Act retains that language and other components of the
CPPA’s definition of child pornography.40 Both statutes prohibited visual
depictions where production of the depiction involved an actual minor engaged in sexually explicit conduct.41 Also, each statute had a clause that
punished morphed child pornography (“morphing clauses”).42 However,
there were significant differences between the two acts.43 First, the CPPA
had 18 U.S.C. section 2256(8)(D), which was a pandering provision in its
definition of child pornography (“CPPA definitional pandering provision”)
that was repealed by the PROTECT Act.44 Also, even though both acts had
a virtual child pornography clause, there are significant differences in the
language used in the clauses.45
a. The virtual child pornography clause
The virtual child pornography clause of the CPPA prohibited a visual
depiction if it appeared to be of a minor engaging in sexually explicit con-

39. Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996, 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8) (2000) (repealed
2003) (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8) (2006)).
40. Compare id. § 2256(8) (2000), with Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to end
the Exploitation of Children Today Act of 2003, 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8) (2006).
41. Compare Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to end the Exploitation of Children
Today Act of 2003, 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8)(A) (2006), with Child Pornography Prevention Act of
1996, 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8)(A) (2000) (repealed 2003).
42. Compare Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to end the Exploitation of Children
Today Act of 2003, 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8)(C) (2006), with Child Pornography Prevention Act of
1996, 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8)(C) (2000) (repealed 2003).
43. McLean, supra note 37, at 238.
44. Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996, 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8)(D) (2000), repealed
by Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to end the Exploitation of Children Today Act of 2003,
Pub. L. 108–21, § 502(a)(3), 117 Stat. 650, 678 (2003), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg
/PLAW-108publ21/pdf/PLAW-108publ21.pdf (last visited Apr. 17, 2012) (including a pandering
clause in the definition of child pornography (section 2256(8)(D)) that was distinct from the pandering provision in section 2252A, which was also part of the CPPA. The CPPA definitional pandering provision (section 2256(8)(D)) was repealed, but the CPPA’s pandering provision in section 2252A was left intact only to be amended by the passage of the PROTECT Act.).
45. Compare Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to end the Exploitation of Children
Today Act of 2003, 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8)(B) (2006), with Child Pornography Prevention Act of
1996, 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8)(B) (2000) (repealed 2003).
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duct.46 This clause sought to cover virtual child pornography in all of its
forms: wholly computer-generated images, morphed images, and child
pornography created with the use of youthful-looking adults.47 In ambitiously attacking these forms of child pornography, Congress sought to
eliminate the indirect harms to children⎯the whetting of a pedophile’s
sexual appetite, the adverse psychological effects on a child whose image
has been used, and the use of the images to seduce children.48 However,
these justifications were dismissed in Free Speech Coalition because there
was no direct harm to children,49 and the “mere tendency of speech to encourage unlawful acts” is not sufficient to ban it.50
As a result, the PROTECT Act narrowly tailored its definition of virtual child pornography by prohibiting a computer image or computergenerated image that is “indistinguishable from” a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct.51 This definition was significantly narrower because
under the CPPA’s “appears to be” language, a defendant could be convicted if the image seemed to be or gave the impression that it was depicting a
minor.52 In contrast, under the PROTECT Act, the depiction had to be indistinguishable so that an ordinary person would believe that the subject
was an actual minor engaged in the sexual conduct.53 This new definition
reaches “substantially less material [than the CPPA] because it requires no
arguable difference between the alleged image and that of a real child.”54
b. The morphing clause
Under the CPPA, morphed child pornography was criminalized if it
appeared that there was “an identifiable minor engaging in sexually explicit
conduct.”55 An “identifiable minor” is a person who was a minor at the

46. See Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996, 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8)(C) (2000), invalidated by Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234.
47. See Liu, supra note 7, at 14.
48. See Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1995, S. REP. NO. 104–358, § 2(2)–(4), at 2
(1996), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CRPT-104srpt358/pdf/CRPT-104srpt358.pdf.
49. See Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. at 251 (“[W]here the speech is neither obscene nor
the product of sexual abuse, it does not fall outside the protection of the First Amendment.”).
50. See id. at 253.
51. See 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8) (2006).
52. See Kornegay, supra note 8, at 2149–50.
53. See 18 U.S.C. § 2256(11) (2006).
54. See McLean, supra note 37, at 238 (citing Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996,
18 U.S.C. § 2256(8)(B)–(D) (2000)).
55. Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996, 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8)(C) (2000) (repealed
2003) (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8)(C) (2006).
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time of production, or a person whose image as a minor was used in a
morphed image where he or she is recognizable as an actual person.56 Under the PROTECT Act, proof of the actual identity of a specific minor does
not need to be established to meet the standard of proof.57 Section
2256(8)(C) (“morphing clause”) was not challenged in Free Speech Coal.58
As a result, the PROTECT Act adopted identical language59 which was later attacked in United States v. Hotaling.60
In Hotaling, the defendant cropped the heads of six minors and pasted
them onto the bodies of adult women engaging in sex acts.61 The defendant
claimed that the morphing clause was overbroad62 and vague.63 Any “visual depiction [that] ha[d] been created, adapted, or modified to appear that
an identifiable minor [was] engaging in sexually explicit conduct” was
prohibited under 18 U.S.C. section 2256(8)(C).64 The court held that the
statute was not overly broad65 because “[t]he statute’s definition of child
pornography ‘precisely track[ed] the material held constitutionally proscribable in Ferber and Miller . . . .’”66 Regarding the vagueness challenge,
the court recognized that the defendant had “no factual or legal support for
his argument”67 and that there is “no doubt the provision intends to criminalize the mere possession of pornographic images of children even when
the images are morphed and no children [are] actually engaged in the sexually explicit conduct.”68 Therefore, the morphing provision of the
PROTECT Act survived both the overbreadth and vagueness challenges.69

56. See 18 U.S.C. § 2256(9) (2000) (repealed 2003) (current version at 18 U.S.C.
§ 2256(9) (2006)).
57. See Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to end the Exploitation of Children Today Act of 2003, 18 U.S.C. § 2256(9)(B) (2006).
58. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. at 242.
59. See 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8)(C) (2006).
60. See generally United States v. Hotaling, 599 F. Supp. 2d 306 (N.D.N.Y. 2008).
61. See id. at 307.
62. See id. at 311.
63. See id. at 322.
64. 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8)(C) (2006).
65. See Hotaling, 599 F. Supp. 2d at 321.
66. Id. (tracking Miller, the statute prohibits obscene material of real or virtual children
engaging in sexually explicit conduct; tracking Ferber, material depicting actual children engaging in sexually explicit conduct is proscribed).
67. Id. at 322.
68. Id.
69. See id. at 321–22.
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2. The Pandering Provision
The CPPA definitional pandering provision prohibited visual depictions that “advertised, promoted, presented, described, or distributed” material in a manner that conveyed the impression that it contained child pornography.70 The “conveyed the impression” language was problematic in Free
Speech Coalition because it suppressed a substantial amount of protected
speech.71 The language had the effect of criminalizing the defendant’s possession of material described, or pandered, as child pornography by someone other than the defendant earlier in the distribution chain.72 An example
of a violation is where a defendant possesses a sexually explicit movie and
knows that the movie is not child pornography, but the box has been mislabeled by a prior distributor to suggest that it is child pornography.73 As a
result, the passage of the PROTECT Act repealed the provision.74
The PROTECT Act’s pandering provision prohibits mere possession
of child pornography in section 2252A(a)(5)75 and known pandering of
such material in section 2252A(a)(3)(B) (“known pandering clause”).76
The problem with the CPPA’s definitional pandering provision is that it
punished more than just pandering by prohibiting possession of material
that could not be banned.77 The PROTECT Act’s known pandering clause
remedied this problem by adding several important features.78 First, it added a scienter requirement of knowledge.79 Next, it included clear wording
(such as “advertises,” “solicits,” and “distributes”) penalizing speech that
accompanies or induces transfers of child pornography.80 Lastly, the defendant must believe that the material is child pornography (and must say
or do something to show that he holds that belief)81 or he must intend to
70. Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996, 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8)(D) (2000), repealed
by Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to end the Exploitation of Children Today Act of
2003, Pub. L. No. 108–21, § 502(a)(3), 117 Stat. 650, 678 (2003).
71. See Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. at 258.
72. See id.
73. See id.
74. Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996, 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8)(D) (2000), repealed
by Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to end the Exploitation of Children Today Act of
2003, Pub. L. 108–21, § 502(a)(3), 117 Stat. 650, 678 (2003).
75. See 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5) (2009).
76. See 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(3)(B) (2009).
77. See United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 286 (2008).
78. See id. at 285.
79. See id. at 294.
80. See id.
81. See id. at 295–96 (“There is also an objective component . . . . The statement or action must objectively manifest a belief that the material is child pornography . . . .”).
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cause someone else to believe that it is child pornography (e.g., by misdescribing the material).82 The effect of these changes is that the defendant
must believe that the material is child pornography and must either make a
statement that reflects that belief or communicate the belief in a manner
that causes another to believe the material is child pornography.83 These
additions are important because they correct a deficiency in the CPPA by
criminalizing the act of pandering rather than prohibiting possession of
protected materials that had once been pandered as child pornography.84
a. Testing the pandering provision
In United States v. Williams, the United States Supreme Court tested
the known pandering clause by considering whether it was unconstitutionally overbroad and/or vague.85 In Williams, the defendant stated in an Internet chat room, that he could “PUT UPLINK CUZ IM FOR REAL” and
posted a link to seven pictures of actual children engaging in sexually explicit conduct.86 After analyzing the scienter requirement and wording of
the statute, the Court held that the pandering provision was constitutional
because it only prohibited offers to provide child pornography and requests
to obtain it.87 In resolving the vagueness challenge, the Court noted that
the statute had no indeterminacy because its elements were based on clear
questions of fact.88 Therefore, the PROTECT Act’s pandering provision
was deemed constitutional.89
b. Pandering provision affirmative defenses
The PROTECT Act was narrowed further with the promulgation of
section 2252A(c)(2) (“no actual minor defense”) in addition to extending
82. See id. at 295 (“The [known pandering clause] suggests that the defendant must actually have held the subjective ‘belief’ that the material or purported material was child pornography. [A] misdescription that leads the listener to believe the defendant is offering child pornography . . . may, however, violate the ‘manner . . . that is intended to cause another to believe’
prong if the misdescription is intentional.”).
83. See Williams, 553 U.S. at 306.
84. See Gabrielle Russell, Note, Pedophiles in Wonderland: Censoring the Sinful in Cyberspace, 98 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1467, 1486 (2008) (emphasis added).
85. See Williams, 553 U.S. at 288.
86. See id. at 291.
87. See id. at 299.
88. See id. at 286.
89. See id. at 307; see also Taylor McNeill, Protecting Our Children or Upholding Free
Speech: Does One Exclude the Other? United States v. Williams, 60 MERCER L. REV. 1059,
1059–60 (2009).
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the protection of section 2252A(c)(1) (“adult defense”) of the CPPA.90
These affirmative defenses only apply to those prosecuted under the pandering provision.91 The adult defense protects the defendant if he or she
can show that the material was produced with “an actual person or persons
engaging in sexually explicit conduct; and . . . each such person was an
adult at the time the material was produced.”92 The no actual minor defense protects a defendant if the child pornography was created without using any actual minors.93 While the two defenses may sound similar, the
adult defense does not apply to computer-generated images.94 In contrast,
the no actual minor defense applies to digital or computer-generated images.95 In addition, the PROTECT Act explicitly eliminated the no actual minor defense for morphing cases.96 The distinction is important for morphed
images because now the only affirmative defense that can be raised requires the defendant to prove that no image of a child was used (i.e., that
the entire image is computer-generated or only adults were used), even if
the depicted sexual conduct did not actually occur.97
3. The PROTECT Obscenity Statute
Section 1466A of the PROTECT Act incorporates elements of the
Miller obscenity test to criminalize obscene images of minors.98 Section
1466A is an “obscenity statute and not a child pornography statute.”99
However, it “technically proscribes obscene child pornography,”100 and an
offender will be punished as if they were convicted of a child pornography
offense.101 The PROTECT Act obscenity statute encompasses more media
than child pornography laws because obscene drawings, cartoons, and
90. See Hotaling, 599 F. Supp. 2d at 318.
91. See 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(c) (2006) (“It shall be an affirmative defense to a charge of
violating paragraph (1), (2), (3)(A), (4), or (5) of subsection (a) . . . .”).
92. Id. § 2252A(c)(1)(A)–(B).
93. See id. § 2252A(c)(2).
94. See Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. at 237.
95. See Hotaling, 599 F. Supp. 2d at 311 (stating that the PROTECT Act’s “no actual minor” defense extends “‘to most possessors and distributors of these defined materials,’” which is
to say “any digital or computer-generated image that is ‘indistinguishable’ of a minor engaging in
sexually explicit conduct” (citation omitted)).
96. See id. at 318.
97. See id.
98. See Paula Bird, Note, Virtual Child Pornography Laws and the Constraints Imposed
by the First Amendment, 16 BARRY L. REV. 161, 167 (2011).
99. United States v. Schales, 546 F.3d 965, 972 (9th Cir. 2008).
100. See Bird, supra note 98, at 176.
101. Id. at 167.
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sculptures can render a person liable.102 In section 1466A(a)(1) (“pandering-O”) a person cannot knowingly produce, distribute, receive, or possess
any visual depiction of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct when
that depiction also meets the three elements of the Miller obscenity test.103
Section 1466A(b)(1) (“possessing-O”), prohibits mere possession of the
same material proscribed in the pandering-O subsection.104
In addition, both the pandering-O and possession-O subsections have
been modified to ban materials containing images of virtual minors without
having to pass the full Miller obscenity test.105 Under section 1466A(a)(2)
(“abridged pandering-O”), any visual depiction is prohibited if it is, or appears to be, of a minor engaging in bestiality, sadism, masochism, or sexual
intercourse if it also lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific
value.106 Section 1466A(b)(2) (“abridged possessing-O”) criminalizes
mere possession of the same material proscribed by the abridged pandering-O provision.107
Section 1466A has been controversial because the abridged pandering-O provision and the abridged possessing-O provision were deemed
overbroad,108 but a later court declined to follow that holding.109 In United
States v. Handley, the defendant was caught with drawings or cartoons that
depicted minors engaging in sexually explicit conduct with animals.110 He
was tried in an Iowa District Court where he filed a motion to dismiss,
claiming the abridged possessing-O and abridged pandering-O clauses
were too vague and overbroad.111 The vagueness challenge was defeated
because the term “minor” provided adequate notice that did not lead to arbitrary enforcement, and because the phrase “appears to be” had a straightforward meaning.112 However, regarding the overbreadth challenge, the
court ruled that pornography could only be proscribed if it was obscene or
102. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 1466A(a) (2006), with 18 U.S.C. § 2256(11) (the child pornography provision “does not apply” when the media form is a drawing, cartoon, sculpture, or painting).
103. See 18 U.S.C. § 1466A(a)(1).
104. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 1466A(a)(1), with 18 U.S.C. § 1466A(b)(1).
105. See Russell, supra note 84, at 1486–87 (stating that only the third element of the
Miller obscenity test is required).
106. 18 U.S.C. § 1466A(a)(2).
107. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 1466A(a)(2), with 18 U.S.C. § 1466A(b)(2).
108. See United States v. Handley, 564 F. Supp. 2d 996, 1007 (S.D. Iowa 2008); see also
Marc H. Greenberg, Comics, Courts & Controversy: A Case Study of the Comic Book Legal Defense Fund, 32 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 121, 165–73 (2012).
109. See United States v. Dean, 635 F.3d 1200, 1206 n.5 (11th Cir. 2011).
110. See Handley, 564 F. Supp. 2d at 999.
111. See id.
112. See id. at 1004.

2012]

CALIFORNIA CHILD PORNOGRAPHY LAWS NEED DIGITAL UPGRADE

241

if it used real minors.113 As a result, both abridged provisions failed because they did not require that either of those conditions be met.114 The
court stated that these subsections banned some forms of protected
speech,115 and they were both struck down as overbroad.116 Despite this
ruling, the motion to dismiss was denied in part when the pandering-O and
possessing-O subsections of the PROTECT Act were deemed constitutional because they incorporated obscenity and they avoided “the same defect[s] as those found in the CPPA . . . .”117
In United States v. Dean, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals refused to follow the opinion in Handley.118 Dean was convicted of violating
the abridged possessing-O provision, but as a defense he asserted the statute was overly broad.119 The court found that the statute was not substantially overbroad because the defendant could not identify a substantial
amount of hypothetically protected material that the statute criminalized.120
The defendant and the court could only conceive of a narrow window of
protected material unjustly punished by the statute⎯“adult actors or computer models [depicting] older teenagers engaged in non-offensive sexual
acts.”121 Since Handley did not determine whether the statute’s overbreadth was substantial, the court refused to follow its reasoning and affirmed Dean’s conviction by upholding the constitutionality of the possessing-O provision.122
Handley and Dean denote a significant inconsistency in the precedent
regarding section 1466A of the PROTECT Act.123 The abridged possessing-O provision has been held unconstitutional in one circuit and constitutional in another.124 This is important because the abridged possessing-O
provision incorporates a truncated version of the obscenity test that punishes
mere possession of material depicting a minor engaged in sexually explicit
113. See id. at 1007.
114. See id.
115. See id. at 1009.
116. See Handley, 564 F. Supp. 2d at 1007.
117. See id. at 1009.
118. See Dean, 635 F.3d at 1206 n.5.
119. See id. at 1202.
120. See id. at 1208.
121. Id.
122. See id. at 1206 n.5.
123. See Bird, supra note 98, at 174 (“Clearly, there is a clash in the interpretation of the
laws regarding virtual child pornography.”).
124. Compare Handley, 564 F. Supp. 2d at 1009 (holding subsections 1466A(a)(2) and
(b)(2) unconstitutional), with Dean, 635 F.3d at 1212 (holding subsection 1466A(a)(2) passes
constitutional muster).
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conduct.125 If constitutional, the possessing-O provision will punish conduct
that does not meet Miller’s test for obscenity.126 Therefore, “it is imperative
that the United States Supreme Court review the constitutionality of section
1466A of the PROTECT Act in order to guide . . . the lower courts . . . .”127
III. CALIFORNIA’S REGULATION OF CHILD PORNOGRAPHY
In 1989, before the United States Supreme Court expressly authorized
the prohibition of the possession of child pornography in Osborne v. Ohio,
and at a time when only nineteen other states prohibited mere possession,
California passed its Penal Code section 311.11.128 The statute makes it an
offense to knowingly possess information, data, images, or computergenerated images when production involved the use of a minor who is personally engaging in or simulating sexual conduct and the possessor knows
that the person depicted is a minor.129 Child pornography displayed on a
computer screen is illegal even without knowledge of the corresponding
data or files on the computer.130
A. California Dad Can Paste Daughter’s Face on Porn Pictures131
People v. Gerber exposes the weakness of California’s current child
pornography law. Gerber used Microsoft Paint to digitally insert the face
of his 13-year-old daughter (“J”) onto graphic pictures of women.132 J testified that Gerber provided her with alcohol, cocaine, marijuana, and possibly methamphetamine in order to convince her to let him take pictures of
her, sometimes in her bra and underwear.133
The child told her mother, causing the police to raid Gerber’s apartment.134 The police found two USB drives with pornographic images with
J’s face on them, but none of the photographs of J in her underwear were

125. Russell, supra note 84, at 1486–87.
126. See id.
127. See Bird, supra note 98, at 174.
128. CAL. PENAL CODE § 311.11(a) (West 2011). See generally People v. Gerber, 196
Cal. App. 4th 368, 382 (2011), review denied, 2011 Cal. LEXIS 8915 (Aug. 17, 2011).
129. See PENAL § 311.11(a).
130. See Tecklenburg v. App. Div. of Super. Ct., 169 Cal. App. 4th 1402, 1418 (2009).
131. Court: Calif. Dad Can Paste Daughter’s Face on Porn Pics, supra note 3.
132. See Gerber, 196 Cal. App. 4th at 376–77.
133. See Court: Calif. Dad Can Paste Daughter’s Face on Porn Pics, supra note 3.
134. Gerber, 196 Cal. App. 4th at 376–77.
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found.135 Gerber admitted to masturbating to the composite photos and
having “sick thoughts.”136
At trial, Gerber was convicted of drug possession and possession of
child pornography, with the latter under CALIFORNIA PENAL CODE section
311.11.137 Gerber was sentenced to thirteen years and four months in prison with a concurrent one-year jail term.138 On appeal, Gerber argued that
there was insufficient evidence to sustain his conviction because the photos
did not “personally” depict J engaging in the sex acts prohibited by the
statute.139 In June 2011, California’s Sixth District Court of Appeal agreed
with the defendant and reversed his conviction for possession of child pornography, remanding the drug charges for retrial.140
In reaching its decision, the court relied on the statute’s plain meaning, legislative history, and legislative intent, as well as the underlying rationales in New York v. Ferber and Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition.141
Ultimately, the court found that photo-editing a child’s head on an adult’s
body does not create liability under section 311.11.142 First, the court analyzed the language of the statute, which states,
[e]very person who knowingly possesses or controls any
matter . . . the production of which involves the use of a person
under the age of 18 years, knowing that the matter depicts a person under the age of 18 years personally engaging in or simulating sexual conduct . . . is guilty of a felony . . . .143
The court announced that the word “personally” means “in person” according to the dictionary144 and the word “depict” means “to represent by or as
if by a picture.”145 Because the court considered these definitions to be
ambiguous, it compared section 311.11 to prior California child pornogra135. Id.
136. Court: Calif. Dad Can Paste Daughter’s Face on Porn Pics, supra note 3.
137. See Gerber, 196 Cal. App. 4th at 373.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 377.
140. Id. at 392.
141. See id. at 386 (“We conclude, however, that the articulated rationales underlying both
the Ferber and Free Speech Coalition decisions compel the conclusion that such altered materials
are closer to virtual child pornography . . . . [T]o avoid constitutional infirmity, the term ‘personally’ in section 311.11 must be construed to mean that a real child actually engaged in or simulated
the sexual conduct depicted, which is a reasonable interpretation given the legislative history.”).
142. See generally id. at 386.
143. PENAL § 311.11.
144. Gerber, 196 Cal. App. 4th at 378.
145. Id.
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phy laws including CALIFORNIA PENAL CODE section 311.2(b) to further
clarify the meaning of child pornography laws.146
In 1977, California passed section 311.2(b) to curb the proliferation of
child pornography, which posed a serious threat to the welfare of California
minors.147 The law made it a felony to “knowingly send . . . into the state
for sale or distribution or to possess with intent to distribute . . . obscene
matter when the person knows that the obscene matter ‘depicts a person
under the age of 18 personally engaging in or personally simulating’ specified sexual acts.”148 The legislative history made it clear that the statute
was meant to prevent the production of child pornography through the exploitation of children.149 The emphasized terminology was used in the passage of sections 312.3, 311.10, and 311.11.150
To the court, the legislative history of sections 311.2, 312.3, 311.10,
and 311.11 suggested that the law would only target material produced using real children, where the offender must know that the person depicted is
an actual child, and the child must actually engage in or simulate the acts.151
To buttress this interpretation, the court examined case precedent.152
The Gerber court focused on the holding of Ferber, which supported
First Amendment protection when non-obscene depictions of sexual conduct did not involve live performances.153 Furthermore, Ferber held that
the state’s interest in protecting children cannot justify restricting materials
that are made without the use of real children because “virtual pornography
is not ‘intrinsically related’ to the sexual abuse of children.”154
Finally, the court decided that Gerber’s depiction of his daughter was
more similar to virtual child pornography than actual child pornography
because the use of photo editing software to place a minor’s head on an
adult’s body does not necessarily involve the exploitation of an actual
child.155 Therefore, the court overturned Gerber’s conviction because photo-editing a child’s head onto an adult’s body is virtual child pornography
that does not personally depict an actual child engaged in the conduct.156
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.

See id. at 379.
See id. at 379–80.
Id.
See id. at 380.
See Gerber, 196 Cal. App. 4th at 380–82.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 384.
Id. at 385 (citation omitted).
See id. at 386.
See Gerber, 196 Cal. App. 4th at 386.
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B. California Is Behind the Times
California fights child pornography with section 311.11 and its obscenity laws, but these laws fall short of protecting the vital interest of the
state⎯i.e., California’s children.157 Gerber illustrates that section 311.11
fails to protect children from the child pornography predators who would
be punished under the federal Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to
end the Exploitation of Children Today Act (“PROTECT Act”).158 The
PROTECT Act punishes additional forms of child pornography media,159
and its definition prohibits more types of child pornography including
morphed child pornography.160
1. Section 311.11 Is Too Weak
Federal law can punish more forms of child pornography than the corresponding California law.161 For example, under California law, a person
cannot be prosecuted for possession of child pornography in the form of
“drawings, figurines, [or] statues . . . .”162 Therefore, the statute would be
inapplicable to “Japanese anime-style cartoons of children engaged in explicit sexual conduct with adults.”163 However, under federal law, possession of such material is punishable.164 Possession of virtual child pornography is illegal because the PROTECT Act’s prohibition applies to “a visual
depiction of any kind, including a drawing, cartoon, sculpture, or painting,”165 and “it is not a required element . . . that the minor actually exist.”166

157. See generally id. (reversing Gerber’s conviction because section 311.11 requires a
real child in the depiction); see also Bird, supra note 98, at 176 (“[U]sing obscenity laws as a
guise to prohibit virtual child pornography is insufficient due to the inability of lawmakers to proscribe simple possession of obscene materials.”).
158. See generally Gerber, 196 Cal. App. 4th at 386 (holding that an actual child must be
depicted to violate the statute); see also Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to end the Exploitation of Children Today Act of 2003, 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(c)(2) (2006) (eliminating the defense used in Gerber in morphed child pornography cases).
159. Compare PENAL § 311.11(d), with Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to end
the Exploitation of Children Today Act of 2003, 18 U.S.C. § 1466A(a)(2)(A) (2006).
160. See United States v. Hotaling, 599 F. Supp. 2d 306, 321 (N.D.N.Y. 2008) (stating
that morphed child pornography includes images altered to appear to depict minors engaged in
sexual conduct).
161. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 1466A(a), with PENAL § 311.11(d).
162. PENAL § 311.11(d).
163. See, e.g., United States v. Whorley, 550 F.3d 326, 330 (4th Cir. 2008).
164. See id. (convicting the defendant for possession of a drawing or cartoon).
165. 18 U.S.C. § 1466A(a)(1)(A).
166. Id. § 1466A(c).
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Therefore, the federal act is clearly stronger because it has comparatively
fewer restraints with respect to forms of child pornography media.167
Also, federal law protects children from being victims of morphed pornography.168 In United States v. Bach, the defendant was charged with possession and receipt of child pornography.169 The material at issue was a photograph where “the head of a well known juvenile . . . was skillfully inserted
onto the body of [a] nude boy so that the resulting depiction appears to be a
picture of [the juvenile] engaging in sexually explicit conduct . . . .”170 The
defendant argued that his conviction was invalid because there was no abuse
of an actual minor.171 However, federal law allowed the State to protect a
minor’s “physical and psychological well being,” and the court found that
there was an identifiable minor child who was victimized when the picture
was displayed.172 However, in California, the Sixth District Court of Appeal
freed Gerber upon his presentation of the “no actual child” argument.173
Therefore, the PROTECT Act provides more expansive protection than California’s section 311.11 when it comes to morphed images.174
2. Obscenity Law Is a Poor Substitute
In addition to section 311.11, California has an obscenity law to punish those who pander obscene material.175 However, there are several problems with using California’s obscenity law to obtain a conviction when
child pornography laws fail.176
California has adopted the definition of obscenity dictated by Miller v.
California.177 However, proving obscenity is difficult because of the sub-

167. See id. § 1466A(a)(1)(A).
168. See Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to end the Exploitation of Children Today Act of 2003, 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8)(C) (2006) (defining “child pornography” as “any visual
depiction,” including computer-generated depictions).
169. United States v. Bach, 400 F.3d 622, 624 (8th Cir. 2005).
170. Id. at 632.
171. Id. at 630.
172. Id. at 632.
173. See Gerber, 196 Cal. App. 4th at 378.
174. Compare Bach, 400 F.3d at 632, with Gerber, 196 Cal. App. 4th at 378.
175. CAL. PENAL CODE § 311.2 (West 2011).
176. See Bird, supra note 98, at 176.
177. Compare Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973), with CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 311(a) (West 2011) (“‘Obscene matter’ means matter, taken as a whole, that to the average person, applying contemporary statewide standards, appeals to the prurient interest, that, taken as a
whole, depicts or describes sexual conduct in a patently offensive way, and that, taken as a whole,
lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.”).
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jective nature of its elements.178 In addition, there are “demanding impositions that the Supreme Court has previously placed on obscenity laws as
compared to child pornography laws.”179 For example, in obscenity cases,
the material can only be removed from circulation with a prior adversarial
hearing, whereas in child pornography cases, no hearing is required.180 Finally, even though most child pornography would likely be considered obscene,181 the United States Supreme Court has ruled that the government
cannot prohibit the mere private possession of obscene material.182 Subsequently, California’s obscenity law only prohibits possession “with intent
to distribute or to exhibit to others,” which is a form of pandering.183
Therefore, using obscenity law as a backup to a weak child pornography
law is “insufficient due to the inability of lawmakers to proscribe simple
possession of obscene materials.”184
IV. CALIFORNIA SHOULD ADOPT A MODIFIED PROTECT ACT
The PROTECT Act remedies the shortcomings of obscenity law by
permitting prosecution for mere possession.185 The PROTECT Act’s obscenity statute (section 1466A) forbids the possession of obscene child
pornography, even without the intent to distribute, as long as “the visual
depiction . . . ha[s] travelled by any means of interstate or foreign commerce, including through the computer.”186 The Fifth Circuit defined the
scope of section 1466A when it held that “the mere transmission . . . via the
Internet is ‘tantamount to moving photographs across state lines and thus
constitutes transport in interstate commerce.’”187 With such a broad holding, it is arguably “nearly impossible to acquire a [sic] material without
some connection to interstate or foreign travel.”188 Therefore, the statute’s

178. See ALLAN IDES & CHRISTOPHER N. MAY, EXAMPLES & EXPLANATIONS: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS 387 (5th ed. 2010) (“It should be clear that the Miller definition of obscenity provides little more than a verbal screen for a highly subjective judgment.”).
179. Bird, supra note 98, at 175.
180. Id. at 175–76.
181. See id. at 175.
182. See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 568 (1969).
183. PENAL § 311.2(a).
184. Bird, supra note 98, at 176.
185. See Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to end the Exploitation of Children Today Act of 2003, 18 U.S.C. § 1466A(b) (2006).
186. Bird, supra note 98, at 176–77.
187. United States v. Moore, 425 F. App’x 347, 351 (5th Cir. 2011) (quoting United
States v. Runyan, 290 F.3d 223, 242 (5th Cir. 2009)).
188. Bird, supra note 98, at 177.
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effect is likely to proscribe mere possession of obscene material because it
is easy to meet the interstate commerce requirement. As a result, the
PROTECT Act’s section 1466A(a)(1) (“possessing-O”) provision would be
a constitutional improvement to California law because the provision has
the effect of prohibiting mere possession of obscenity.189
A. The First Challenge of Adopting a Californian PROTECT Act:
Narrow Language
When a law imposes content-based restrictions on speech, it can survive a First Amendment challenge if it: (1) serves a compelling state interest and (2) is narrowly tailored.190 It is beyond doubt that the state has a
compelling interest in protecting the physical and psychological well being
of minors.191 However, “[t]he ‘governmental interest in protecting children
from harmful materials . . . does not justify an unnecessarily broad suppression of speech . . . .’”192 Therefore, California should adopt a version of the
PROTECT Act (“Cal-Pro”) with wording that avoids overbreadth issues.
The first challenge in creating Cal-Pro would be drafting the statutory
language narrowly so that the statute would survive a constitutional challenge to its validity.193 Case precedent offers guidance in adopting narrow
language, and it indicates that Cal-Pro may use language nearly identical to
the PROTECT Act to pass constitutional muster.194 After all, the provisions that have been challenged on constitutional grounds have overwhelmingly been upheld as constitutional.195
189. See generally United States v. Mees, No. 4:09CR00145ERW, 2009 WL 1657420, at
*4, *5 (E.D. Mo. June 10, 2009) (holding section 1466A(b)(1) is not vague or overbroad).
190. IDES & MAY, supra note 178, at 332.
191. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 756–57 (1982).
192. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 252 (2002) (citation omitted).
193. See, e.g., United States v. Handley, 564 F. Supp. 2d 996, 1007 (S.D. Iowa 2008)
(holding subsection 1466A(a)(2) unconstitutionally overbroad).
194. See generally United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 306–07 (2008) (holding subsection 2252A(a)(3)(B) constitutional); United States v. Schales, 546 F.3d 965, 972–73 (9th Cir.
2008) (holding subsection 1466A(a)(1) constitutional); United States v. Halter, 259 F. App’x 738,
740 (6th Cir. 2008) (holding subsection 2252A(a)(4)(B) constitutional); United States v. Smith,
459 F.3d 1276, 1285 (11th Cir. 2006) (holding subsection 2252A(a)(5) constitutional); Mees,
2009 WL 1657420, at *4–5 (holding subsection 1466A(b)(1) constitutional); Handley, 564
F. Supp. 2d at 1007 (holding subsections 1466A(a)(2) and (b)(2) unconstitutionally overbroad);
United States v. Hotaling, 599 F. Supp. 2d 306, 321–22 (N.D.N.Y. 2008) (holding subsection
2256(8)(c) constitutional).
195. See generally Williams, 553 U.S. at 306–07 (holding subsection 2252A(a)(3)(B)
constitutional); Schales, 546 F.3d at 972–73 (holding subsection 1466A(a)(1) constitutional);
Halter, 259 F. App’x at 740 (holding subsection 2252A(a)(4)(B) constitutional); Smith, 459 F.3d
at 1285 (holding subsection 2252A(a)(5) constitutional); Mees, 2009 WL 1657420, at *4–5 (hold-
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Cal-Pro should use the definition of child pornography found in the
PROTECT Act’s section 2256, and it should criminalize knowing pandering according to section 2252A(a)(3)(B) of the PROTECT Act (the “known
pandering clause”). If Cal-Pro adopted section 2256, it would define child
pornography as a visual depiction whose production “involves the use of a
minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct.”196 In addition, the definition
of child pornography would extend to depictions that are indistinguishable
from “a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct,” and depictions that
are “created, adapted, or modified to appear that an identifiable minor is
engaging in sexually explicit conduct.”197 Cal-Pro’s pandering provision
would prohibit knowingly advertising, promoting, presenting, distributing,
or soliciting child pornography using any means of interstate or foreign
commerce in a manner that reflects the belief, or in a manner that “is intended to cause another to believe [] that the material” is child pornography.198 These words should be adopted because the United States Supreme
Court approved their constitutionality in United States v. Williams.199
In Williams, the Supreme Court held in a 7-2 split200 that the
PROTECT Act’s known pandering clause is not vague or overbroad.201
The Court also supported the PROTECT Act’s definition of child pornography by stating, “[i]ts definition of material or purported material that may
not be pandered or solicited precisely tracks . . . material held constitutionally proscribable . . . .”202 Furthermore, various courts have favorably ruled
on the constitutionality of the other provisions of sections 2256 and
2252A,203 making it highly likely that if Cal-Pro adopted identical versions
of those provisions, the provisions would be upheld as constitutional.

ing subsection 1466A(b)(1) constitutional); Handley, 564 F. Supp. 2d at 1007 (holding subsections 1466A(a)(2) and (b)(2) unconstitutionally overbroad); Hotaling, 599 F. Supp. 2d at 321–22
(holding subsection 2256(8)(c) constitutional).
196. Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to end the Exploitation of Children Today
Act of 2003, 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8)(A) (2006).
197. Id. § 2256(8)(A)–(C).
198. Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to end the Exploitation of Children Today
Act of 2003, 18 U.S.C. § 2252(A)(a)(3)(B) (2006).
199. See Williams, 553 U.S. at 307.
200. See generally id. at 310 (“Justice Souter, with whom Justice Ginsburg joins,
dissenting.”).
201. Id. at 285–86.
202. Id. at 285.
203. See, e.g., Halter, 259 F. App’x at 740 (holding subsection 2252A(a)(4)(B) constitutional); Smith, 459 F.3d at 1285 (holding subsection 2252A(a)(5)(B) constitutional); Hotaling,
599 F. Supp. 2d at 321–22 (holding subsection 2256(8)(c) constitutional).
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Similarly, Cal-Pro should adopt the affirmative defenses described in
the PROTECT Act to ensure that the statute’s scope is narrowly tailored to
ending child sexual abuse, although it will be at the cost of some of its protective capacity.204 Both of the affirmative defenses described in section
2252A(c) should be employed, because solely having 2252A(c)(1) (the
“adult defense”) would leave a substantial amount of speech—i.e., computer-generated images—unprotected.205
If Cal-Pro only used section
2252A(c)(2) (the “no actual minor” defense), then pandering completely
computer-generated images would be legal.206 However, a great amount of
material would still be criminalized because the defense is disallowed in
morphing cases.207 By adopting both affirmative defenses, it is more likely
that Cal-Pro will be narrow enough to overcome challenges to its constitutionality while simultaneously protecting morphed images of children.
Cal-Pro should also identically draft the PROTECT Act’s obscenity
provisions including 1466A(a)(1) and 1466A(b)(1) (“possessing-O”).208
These provisions criminalize production, distribution, or possession of visual depictions of children engaged in sexually explicit conduct, regardless
of whether they are real, if the depictions are also obscene.209 In United
States v. Whorley the court indicated that this language was a “valid restriction on obscene speech under Miller [v. California],” and that “obscenity in any form is not protected by the First Amendment.”210 Since the Supreme Court repeatedly finds that the regulation of material meeting the
Miller test is not overbroad, there is a strong probability that Cal-Pro’s
identical language would also be upheld.211
However, Cal-Pro should not adopt identical language to sections
1466A(a)(2) (“abridged pandering-O”) and 1466A(b)(2) (“abridged possessing-O”) of the PROTECT Act.212 The same language should not be
implemented because the United States Supreme Court ruled that pornog-

204. Gray Mateo, Note, The New Face of Child Pornography: Digital Imaging Technology and the Law, 2008 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 175, 189 (2008).
205. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. at 237.
206. Hotaling, 599 F. Supp. 2d at 311 (stating that the PROTECT Act’s “no actual minor” defense extends to “most possessors and distributors of these defined materials,” which is to
say “any digital or computer generated image that is ‘indistinguishable’ from that of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct” (citation omitted)).
207. Id. at 318.
208. See 18 U.S.C. § 1466A.
209. See id.
210. Id.; United States v. Whorley, 550 F.3d 326, 330 (4th Cir. 2008).
211. See, e.g., Schales, 546 F.3d at 971.
212. See 18 U.S.C. § 1466A(a)(2), (b)(2).
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raphy is protected unless it is obscene or uses actual minors.213 However,
these provisions are problematic because they are a “truncation”214 of the
Miller standards for obscenity, and they do not require the material to meet
the definition of child pornography.215 For this reason, some legal scholars
predict that these provisions will fail a constitutional challenge.216 This
prediction becomes even more likely because there is no affirmative defense to narrow the scope of the materials prohibited.217
Lastly, Cal-Pro would not be significantly weakened by excluding these
provisions because there is “almost complete redundancy of the conduct
criminalized by [pandering-O] and [possessing-O] with that of [abridged
pandering-O] and [abridged possessing-O].”218 The outcome of U.S. v.
Handley proves this redundancy because abridged pandering-O and abridged
possessing-O were deemed unconstitutional, while their more complete
counterparts were constitutional and sufficient to charge the defendant.219
In summary, Cal-Pro should adopt PROTECT’s definition of child
pornography, its pandering provisions, and its pandering-O and possessingO provisions. However, it should not accept abridged pandering-O and
abridged possessing-O provisions for two reasons: (1) scholarly prediction
that the provisions will fail because of the Supreme Court’s strong language, and (2) because exclusion of the provisions will have minimal impact on Cal-Pro’s protective capacity.
B. Cal-Pro’s Second Challenge: Overcrowding
1. Lawmakers Should Do More for Overcrowded Prisons220
Most likely, California’s legislature will take into account the special
circumstances of the state when examining California’s child pornography
law. Unfortunately, California’s prison system suffers from a severe over-

213. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. at 240.
214. Williams, 444 F.3d at 1296 (11th Cir. 2006), rev’d, 553 U.S. 285 (2008).
215. See Handley, 564 F. Supp. 2d at 1007.
216. Russell, supra note 84, at 1487 (citing Kornegay, supra note 8, at 2164).
217. See 18 U.S.C. § 1466A. While this statute has an affirmative defense, it does not
limit its scope because the statute applies to virtual images including drawings, cartoons, and
computer-generated images.
218. Handley, 564 F. Supp. 2d at 1007.
219. Id. at 1009.
220. See generally Ryan Gabrielson, Analyst Says Lawmakers Should Do More for Overcrowded Prisons, CALIF. WATCH (Aug. 8, 2011), http://californiawatch.org/dailyreport/analystsays-lawmakers-should-do-more-overcrowded-prisons-11940.
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crowding problem.221 The prison system has over 140,000 inmates, but the
system’s maximum capacity is 78,858.222 The overcrowding in California’s prisons causes “severe and unlawful mistreatment of prisoners
through grossly inadequate provision of medical and mental health care.”223
As a result, in Brown v. Plata, the United States Supreme Court ordered
California to reduce its prison population from 175%224 to 137.5% of its
capacity within two years.225
In order to adhere to this Court Order, California has reformed its
prison system by “changing the focus from incarceration to rehabilitation”
through its “Realignment” plan.226 The Realignment plan sends nonserious, non-violent, and non-sexual convicted felons to county jails instead
of state prisons.227 In addition, after non-serious, non-violent, non-highrisk sex offenders serve their felony sentences, they are “subject to community supervision provided by a county agency . . . .”228 As a result, lowlevel felons will be subject to local jurisdiction, where the counties are instructed to employ community-based punishment demonstrated to reduce
recidivism, such as mandatory community service, restorative justice programs, psychological counseling, mental health treatment, and home detention with electronic or GPS monitoring.229 However, the Legislative Analyst’s Office (“LAO”) released a report concluding “the realignment plan
alone is unlikely to reduce overcrowding sufficiently within the two-year
deadline set by the court.”230
In light of the overcrowding problem, the sentencing guidelines of the
PROTECT Act should be modified in Cal-Pro. Currently, if a person is
convicted under the pandering provisions of section 2252A for transport221. See Five Key Facts on California’s Prison Overcrowding, WHAT THE FOLLY?! (July
5, 2011), http://www.whatthefolly.com/2011/07/05/us-news-five-key-facts-on-californias-prisonovercrowding/.
222. Id.
223. Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1923 (2011).
224. OUR VIEW: No Easy Choices on Prison Overcrowding, GADSDEN TIMES (Nov. 14,
2011), http://www.gadsdentimes.com/article/20111114/OPINION/111119896/1001/NEWS?Title
=OUR-VIEW-No-easy-choices-on-prison-overcrowding&tc=ar.
225. Plata, 131 S. Ct. at 1945–47.
226. California Attempts to Fix Broken Prison System with “Realignment”, WHAT THE
FOLLY?! (Oct. 4, 2011), http://www.whatthefolly.com/2011/10/04/california-attempts-to-fixbroken-prison-system-with-realignment/.
227. Jens Erik Gould, As California Fights Prison Overcrowding, Some See a Golden Opportunity, TIME (Sept. 29, 2011), http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,2094840,00.html.
228. CAL. PENAL CODE § 3451 (West 2011).
229. CAL. PENAL CODE § 3450 (West 2011).
230. Mac Taylor, A Status Report: Reducing Prison Overcrowding in California, LEGIS.
ANALYST’S OFF. (Aug. 2011), http://www.ccpoa.org/files/overcrowding_080511.pdf.
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ing, receiving, distributing, reproducing, advertising, or selling child pornography, they are subject to a fine and imprisonment for a minimum of
five years and a maximum of twenty years.231 The same punishment applies if a person is convicted under section 1466A(a) for distributing, receiving, or possessing with intent to distribute obscene depictions of minors.232 Furthermore, if the offender has a prior conviction under
statutorily defined sections, then his or her sentence is increased to a minimum of fifteen years and a maximum of forty years.233 However, an offender will receive a fine or imprisonment for a maximum of ten years if he
or she is convicted of possession of child pornography (section
2252A(a)(5))234 or possession of obscene visual depictions of a minor (section 1466A(b)(1)).235 These sentences may also be enhanced to a minimum
of ten years and a maximum of twenty years for prior convictions.236 However, sending people to prison for such rigid lengths of time would only
serve to exacerbate the overcrowding problem.
2. California’s Big Chance to Get Smart on Crime237
Prior to Realignment, California’s reigning policy was “tough on
crime,” and it did not focus on preventing recidivism.238 The recidivism
rate is the percentage of individuals who return to prison within three years
of their release.239 California has one of the highest rates in the country at
67.5%.240 Since recidivists made up 37% of California’s prison population
in 2007,241 Realignment’s resolution of this issue could significantly reduce
overcrowding. In fact, other states report success in lowering their prison
populations through alternative programs that have stabilized and reduced
their recidivism rates.242 For example, an American Civil Liberties Union
(“ACLU”) report indicated that Mississippi was able to reduce its prison
population by 22%, while simultaneously lowering its crime rate over a
three-year period by allowing inmates to earn time off from their sentences
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.

18 U.S.C. § 2252A(b)(1).
See 18 U.S.C. § 1466A(a).
See 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(b)(1).
Id. § 2252A(a)(5).
See 18 U.S.C. § 1466A(b).
18 U.S.C. § 2252A(b)(2).
See Gould, supra note 227.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Five Key Facts on California’s Prison Overcrowding, supra note 221.
Gould, supra note 227.
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and employing programs that focused on education and reentry.243 Kansas
used similar reforms to achieve a 14.6% reduction in prison growth as of
2009, and an 18% drop in crime rates from 2003–2009.244 Realignment has
already begun enacting these kinds of programs to reduce recidivism.245
However, California should also implement the ACLU’s recommended
sentencing scheme into Cal-Pro because the LAO does not believe that the
current programs are enough to reduce overcrowding.246
Two reforms recommended by the ACLU that can be adopted by CalPro are eliminating habitual offender laws247 and terminating mandatory
minimum sentences.248 The ACLU has suggested that “[s]tates should
eliminate . . . habitual offender laws that allow for automatic sentence enhancements based on prior convictions . . . .”249 Since “habitual offender
laws overcrowd our prisons,”250 Cal-Pro should remove the sentence enhancements mandating higher minimum and maximum sentencing for prior
convictions. Similarly, mandatory minimum sentences are problematic because they can be “strict, inflexible, and often irrational sentencing guidelines that . . . [tie] judges’ hands.”251 Therefore, the ACLU recommends
that states “eliminate mandatory minimum sentenc[ing] lengths for crimes
and provide judges with slightly more discretion.”252
Another reason to eliminate habitual offender laws and mandatory
minimum sentencing is that they are counterproductive to the Realignment
plan.253 Since it is unlikely that those convicted of mere possession or pandering of child pornography will be classified as “high risk sex offend243. Id.
244. Smart Reform Is Possible: States Reducing Incarceration Rates and Costs While
Protecting Communities, ACLU 1, 25 (Aug. 2011), http://www.aclu.org/files/assets/smartreform
ispossible.pdf.
245. See supra note 229 and accompanying text (listing several community-based punishments that are designed to reduce recidivism).
246. See Taylor, supra note 230 (stating that the current plan is unlikely to meet the twoyear deadline).
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. Id.
252. Smart Reform Is Possible, supra note 244.
253. See generally Post Release Community Supervision Act of 2011, PENAL § 3451(b)(4)
(indicating community supervision unavailable until after prison term served for high-risk sex offenders); RUDY BERMUDEZ, TODD SPITZER & JAMES TILTON, CALIFORNIA HIGH RISK SEX OFFENDER TASK FORCE 7 (Aug. 15, 2006), available at http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/Parole/Sex_Offender_
Facts/docs_SOMB/HRSO_taskForce.pdf (providing a comprehensive summary of what classifies as
a high-risk sex offender and the terms of parole).
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ers,”254 then it is probable that many Cal-Pro convicts will be eligible for
community-based punishment after serving their sentences. However,
when sentence-enhancement provisions “mandat[e] unnecessarily long
prison sentences”255 and convicted felons are only eligible for community
supervision after they have completed their sentence,256 then their access to
community programs—programs that have been demonstrated to reduce
recidivism—will be adversely affected.
V. CONCLUSION
Case precedent established a compelling interest in protecting California’s children,257 which was undermined when the court overturned the
child pornography conviction under CALIFORNIA PENAL CODE section
311.11 in People v. Gerber.258 This controversial decision exposed many
of the weaknesses of the California statute. The Prosecutorial Remedies
and Other Tools to end the Exploitation of Children Today Act
(“PROTECT Act”) provides stronger protection for children because it covers more types of media,259 and it can succeed in prosecuting morphed
child pornography where section 311.11 failed.260 In addition, obscenity
law is insufficient to make up for the weakness of section 311.11 because
its elements are subjective,261 and the state cannot prohibit mere private
possession of obscenity.262 For these reasons, this Comment proposes that
California adopt the California PROTECT Act (“Cal-Pro”).
However, some provisions of Cal-Pro cannot copy the exact language
of the PROTECT Act because California must narrowly tailor its language
254. See BERMUDEZ, SPITZER &TILTON, supra note 253 (stating that factors for high-risk
sex offenders include: sexually violent predators, convictions related to two separate victims with
at least one being a victim of a sex crime, felony convictions for child molestation, felony convictions for a forcible sex offense, and criminal history).
255. Smart Reform Is Possible, supra note 244.
256. PENAL § 3451(a) (“[A]fter serving a prison term for a felony [all persons] shall . . .
be subject to community supervision.”).
257. See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 756–57 (1982).
258. People v. Gerber, 196 Cal. App. 4th 368, 392 (2011), review denied, 2011 Cal.
LEXIS 8915 (Aug. 17, 2011).
259. Compare CAL. PENAL CODE § 311.11(d) (West 2011), with Prosecutorial Remedies
and Other Tools to End the Exploitation of Children Today Act of 2003, 18 U.S.C. § 1466A(a)
(2006).
260. Compare Gerber, 196 Cal. App. 4th at 386 (overturning morphing conviction), with
United States v. Bach, 400 F.3d 622 (8th Cir. 2005) (upholding morphing conviction).
261. IDES & MAY, supra note 178, at 387 (“It should be clear that the Miller definition of
obscenity provides little more than a verbal screen for a highly subjective judgment.”).
262. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 568 (1969).
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according to case precedent,263 and it must consider the state’s prison overcrowding problem.264 Accordingly, the provisions of sections 2252A and
2256, and subsections 1466A(a)(1) (“pandering-O”) and 1466A(b)(1) (“possessing-O”) should be identically drafted because case precedent has upheld
these provisions as constitutional.265 Nevertheless, the provisions of subsections 1466A(a)(2) (“abridged pandering-O”) and 1466A(b)(2) (“abridged
possessing-O”) should not be adopted because they prohibit speech that is
neither child pornography nor obscenity according to the Miller test.266 Additionally, Cal-Pro’s sentencing provisions should accommodate the American Civil Liberties Union’s suggestions to eliminate minimum sentencing
and mandatory enhancements for habitual offenders267 because it could interfere with Realignment’s attempt at reducing overcrowding.
In conclusion, Cal-Pro will grant more protection for California’s
children, but it may not be fit for implementation until after the state has
complied with the United States Supreme Court’s mandate to reduce overcrowding.268 However, once Cal-Pro is adopted, the suggested modifications will provide a narrowly tailored law that is compatible with Realignment’s goal of reducing recidivism and overcrowding.

263. See generally IDES & MAY, supra note 178, at 332.
264. See Five Key Facts on California’s Prison Overcrowding, supra note 221.
265. See generally United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 299 (2008) (holding subsection 2252A(a)(3)(b) constitutional); United States v. Schales, 546 F.3d 965, 972 (9th Cir. 2008)
(holding subsection 1466A(a)(1) constitutional); United States v. Halter, 259 F. App’x 738, 743
(6th Cir. 2008) (holding subsection 2252A(a)(4)(B) constitutional); United States v. Smith, 459
F.3d 1276, 1288–89 (11th Cir. 2006) (holding subsection 2252A(a)(5) constitutional); United
States v. Mees, No. 4:09CR00145ERW, 2009 WL 1657420, at *2–4 (E.D. Mo. June 10, 2009)
(holding subsection 1466A(b)(1) constitutional); United States v. Hotaling, 599 F. Supp. 2d 306,
321 (N.D.N.Y. 2008) (holding subsection 2256(8)(c) constitutional).
266. Handley, 564 F. Supp. 2d 996, 1007 (S.D. Iowa 2008).
267. Smart Reform Is Possible, supra note 244.
268. See generally Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1917–18 (2011) (requiring a courtmandated population limit to remedy overcrowding in a manner than may conflict with a stronger
child pornography law).

